Responsibility. The first to assume responsibility for the failure on October 7 was IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi.
- He was followed by the head of the Shin Bet security agency Ronen Bar, the head of the Military Intelligence Directorate Aharon Haliva, and the Southern Command GOC Yaron Finkelstein all acknowledged their responsibility.
- The head of the Research Division in Military Intelligence, Brigadier General Amit Saar clarified that there was a failure in providing a pinpointed warning that could have prevented the attack. Similarly, the commander of the Gaza Division, Brigadier-General Avi Rosenfeld, owned up to his failure in defending the settlements.
Upon closer inspection, it is immediately apparent that on the list of those taking responsibility, there is one figure who is conspicuously missing:
- the commander of Unit 8200, the leading signal intelligence collection agency in Israel, under the IDF.
- It turns out that the central and dominant intelligence collection body of the State of Israel, responsible for about 80% of the intelligence gathered and produced for all Israeli intelligence branches, does not believe it has any responsibility for what happened on Black Saturday.
On the contrary, in internal discussions, the commander of Unit 8200, Brig. Gen. Y asserts that the unit provided all the necessary intelligence.
- He claims that everything was on the table. According to him, the responsible parties are the Research Division analysts and its head, Sa’ar, who did not know what to do with the information they received.
Saar, as mentioned, has already taken responsibility, but Brig. Gen. Y’s claim, upon further scrutiny, proves the exact opposite, and quite astonishingly: Unit 8200 had everything right under its nose – it simply did nothing with it and did not pass the information onward.
- All relevant commanders in the unit were asleep at the wheel, led by Brig. Gen. Y. He was preoccupied with promoting various projects such as helping the disadvantaged, (an important matter in itself), dealing with climate (similarly important), and various social issues, forgetting the basics – intelligence.
Reading material from the field personnel, establishing teams, investigating, asking questions, and scrutinizing every detail to ensure his unit was not wrong – all neglected, even though there were voices within the unit who sounded the alarm – in writing – that catastrophe was imminent.
When the investigative committee is formed after the war, its findings will expose the details of what happened and the negligence that occurred, the lack of professionalism, and the failed handling of intelligence.
It will also shed light on unsuitable individuals appointed to highly sensitive positions as the heads of listening units and geographical subunits, some of whom did not even answer the phone to join a consultation held in the hours preceding the attack, against the backdrop of accumulating troubling intelligence.
- The responsibility of Unit 8200 does not end here. In the months leading up to the attack, real-time monitoring of the tactical communication of Hamas operatives on their radios was halted.
Had they been monitored, at the very least Israeli intelligence would have had time to deploy forces and mitigate the scale of the invasion.
- The decision to cease real-time monitoring was made with approval from all levels, grounded in professional considerations but fundamentally driven by pride: the belief that we will know everything, always, in every arena and against every enemy.
Halevi, immediately after the attack, made it clear that he wanted to avoid internal wars in the military and said the blame game was going to wait until after the war. Later, an agreement was reached with the head of the Shin Bet to prevent clashes between organizations, and to focus on the military campaign.
Unit 8200 is the flagship body of Israeli intelligence. After the war, questions will arise about dependence on cyber and the need to return to fundamentals, especially in the field of human intelligence (HUMINT). But before that, it is essential to ensure that the body that failed – and is incapable of acknowledging its failure – does not fail again.
Brigadier General Y. is an optimistic person who has written at the top of every document he has written since October 7 the title “Facing Forward.” However, with the current war potential expanding to other fronts, which are just as dangerous, it is necessary to ensure that Unit 8200 is on the right track. It is no longer a matter of ego but of national security in its deepest sense.
Two more notes on responsibility:
The intelligence failure does not absolve the military defense systems, which proved irrelevant against Hamas’ attack.
It also does not absolve the responsibility of the civilian leadership (especially the prime minister), which has been warned several times in the past year that the internal crisis translates into weakness among Israel’s enemies, potentially leading to a catastrophe.
Much of the tragedy lies in the intelligence, which managed to sound the alarm accurately in a strategic sense but completely failed to provide real-time warnings that could have mitigated or minimized Hamas’ attack. The inquiry commission will need to address all these aspects after the war, revealing that they all operated below expectations and, in less polished words, failed in their roles.
Those who attended the cabinet session on Tuesday night, where the deal for the release of the hostages was approved, reported that the IDF chief of staff gave an outstanding performance. He was focused, and articulate, answered every question calmly, and even managed to persuade the ministers of the religious Zionist faction to change their preliminary decision to oppose the plan and support it.
The only ones who were not convinced were the ministers of the far-Right party Otzma Yehudit.
- Amazingly, those who support the release of the Jewish murderer Amir Ben-Oliel opposed the release of Israeli children who were kidnapped.
It is even more amazing that two of the ministers did not even bother to stay until the end of the discussion. They cast their vote and went home. It was another demonstration of the irresponsibility of a group lacking responsibility, which this time also revealed a lack of direction and sensitivity: While the families of the kidnapped have not slept since October 7 (and who knows what the kidnappers themselves are going through), the ministers preferred to go to sleep.
Back to the discussion. The ministers wanted to know how the forces would defend themselves during the ceasefire days. They recalled what happened during the lull in Operation Protective Edge and the attack in which Hamas killed Hadar Goldin (and two of his comrades) and kidnapped his body. The IDF clarified that the ceasefire does not require a defensive stance – it requires a non-belligerent stance. The forces can change their location in their resting areas, and they can get a breather – an important matter when many fighters have been in Gaza continuously since the ground operation began, and some have not seen home since Black Saturday.
The concern in the IDF is precisely the misinterpretations rooted in misunderstandings. Fighters who identify someone emerging from a tunnel or a house convince themselves that it is a threat and open fire. Such a local mistake could derail the entire ceasefire.
- Another question relates to the possibility that Hamas will exploit the ceasefire to improve its positions.
The threat is clear: tunnels will be rebuilt and used, arsenals of ammunition and food and fuel depots will be replenished, and forces may move between sectors, with kidnapped individuals potentially being transferred to new hiding places. These are tactical problems that the IDF is supposed to overcome from the moment it renews the fighting. The ceasefire will also allow the Israeli side to better organize for the next stage of the war.
Beyond the detailed responses given, there is also the naked truth: the State of Israel and the IDF failed to provide defense during the Black Sabbath. They abandoned the residents of the kibbutzim and those celebrating at a party near Re’im, where hundreds were massacred.
This has created an immense debt, larger than in previous kidnapping cases, especially with such a significant number of civilians, including children, women, and adults, at stake. With no practical way to release them, Israel is required to find an alternative solution.
The pressing question is what would have happened if Israel had refused this deal and continued to exert more pressure to push Hamas further into a corner, as suggested by some politicians and analysts. The fair answer is that no one knows for sure. It is possible that Hamas would have become even more entrenched, but it is also likely that they would have solidified their positions and perhaps resorted to killing hostages to specifically pressure Israel.
The bad news is that Israel made a deal with the devil, and Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar is a particularly nefarious devil who knows Israeli society well, exploiting its weaknesses. The good news is that we are not entirely in his hands. In the issue of the kidnapped individuals, yes, but in the broader war, Israel can go all the way if it follows through on its statements.
After all this, it needs to be clarified: the main thing is still ahead of us. There will be tough, tumultuous, painful, and nerve-wracking days and weeks. Mainly in the context of the kidnapped individuals, but not only. The lull poses risks, but there are also opportunities. After the tough sequence of recent weeks, the State of Israel needs a breath of fresh air and some good news. The release of the kidnapped and the easing of the situation around it are expected to provide some of that.
Source: Yoav Limor – Tsrael Hayom